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Unlike many other public services, the NHS is not subject to local democratic control. In this post – a second extract
from Democratic Audit’s new ebook – Sally Ruane examines the barriers to local democratic engagement in the
NHS, and identifies ways to improve accountability through local authorities and Healthwatch. 
What influence do communities have over their local NHS services? Credit: Philippa Willitts, CC BY-NC 2.0
Barriers to democratic engagement
There are numerous barriers to democratic engagement in health services. One concerns the scepticism with which
citizens may approach engagement in formal involvement mechanisms. For example, a frequent complaint
surrounding local consultation exercises is that local managers have made their decisions prior to the consultation.
Second, bodies charged with championing the patient and public interest have typically in recent years had weak
powers. Healthwatch, for example, has no right to compel the directors of relevant institutions to attend meetings
and answer questions. This lack of powers pushes the organisation to see representation and championing as a
matter of technical and procedural accomplishment rather than as a political process characterised by tension,
negotiation or conflict between counterposing powers over differences in values and interests and competition over
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resources. These organisations might even pride themselves on being studiedly apolitical. This can reinforce a view
that involvement is intended to be carefully managed.
Third, would-be participants can find themselves swamped by the complexity and sheer scale of organisational
structures and processes. This is compounded by repeated restructuring in which it takes months or even years for
those working within the system and other experts (never mind patients and citizens) to comprehend new
processes, functions and relationships and a changed distribution of resources. Alternatively, participants can get
bogged down in involvement processes focused on the details of implementation and lose sight of the overall
direction of local or government driven policy.
On a more practical level, some of the involvement mechanisms, such as local authority or clinical commissioning
group (CCG) meetings, whilst held in public, take place during the working day. Business is conducted in an arcane
language, incomprehensible to many people, and documented on an industrial scale. Documents for some Trust
meetings can run into hundreds of pages. Even briefer documentation can cover complex issues and be presented
in a way which makes it difficult or impossible for those outside the organisation to follow and interpret.
The challenge of navigating this vast and difficult terrain – with documentation for some meetings sometimes
released only one week in advance – can be even more off-putting if the would-be participants suspect official
documents are deliberately used to hide information which local managers and decision-makers would prefer not to
be noticed. As is the case across public services more widely, members of the public must also grapple with
technical details which often in modern governance become central to arguments designed to justify certain policy
preferences. For instance, technical arguments based on specialist knowledge feature prominently (and sometimes
inaccurately) in arguments surrounding proposed service reconfigurations (e.g. the argument that bigger, fewer units
will produce better outcomes).
Finally, in some respects the big bang system reform enshrined in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act with the
dramatic extension of the market model, itself and at a very fundamental level, undermines the abilities of citizens to
hold health service providers to account. An increasing portion of health services will be provided by commercial
providers who are not required to answer information requests under the Freedom of Information Act and whose
NHS clients are not protected by human rights legislation.  It will also be difficult for the public to keep up with which
organisation has which contract, which contracts are up for tender, and what precisely different companies and third
sector organisations are providing.
Furthermore, it will be an arduous matter to hold the relevant public commissioning authority to account for services
they no longer deliver. This is likely to become all the more complex under the new principal contractor –
subcontractor model whereby a large contract for NHS services is signed with a single provider which can then sub-
contract to other providers. Again, these difficulties will be encountered in other public service sectors where
comparable market policies are being implemented.
Genuine successes in local democracy – overview and scrutiny
If we consider where democratic engagement might be real and effective, it is in the local authority that perhaps the
greatest potential for genuine citizenship influence over decision-making is to be found. Local authority committees
include and are chaired by locally elected councillors. The health overview and scrutiny committees (OSCs) were
established following the Local Government Act of 2000 and took on the function of scrutiny and the powers to
consult previously held by Community Health Councils (CHCs). Currently these committees typically embrace
scrutiny of social care as well.
Although variable in effectiveness, OSCs have become particularly significant in relation to controversial local,
regional or national plans to reconfigure health services, especially where local services are threatened with
closure. As well as responding to NHS consultation exercises, citizens individually – but, more effectively,
collectively through campaigning – have been able to ensure their views are heard by addressing their concerns to
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Download the full ebook here.
the OSC. OSCs have the power to require health service managers to supply information and to account for their
proposals and decisions and for their provision and they also have the power
to refer key decisions about substantial health service changes to the
Secretary of State for review (another power inherited from CHCs). In the
case of the reorganisation of children’s heart surgery across England, for
example, this power has had a major impact in halting the proposed
changes.
Changes introduced under the coalition government (section 190 of the 2012
Health and Social Care Act) expand the remit of OSCs to encompass
independent sector providers which are equally (with public providers)
required to provide information, attend meetings, answer questions and
consult when substantial changes to health services are proposed. The
changes also transfer both the duty of scrutiny and the power to refer to the
council as a whole. This means that a larger group of people would need to
be convinced of the benefits of a referral – but also that any referral made
would carry greater legitimacy. Any campaign which hopes to succeed in
halting unpopular reconfiguration proposals must expect to have to convince
the OSC first. The establishment of an Independent Reconfiguration Panel in
2003, charged by the Secretary of State to review contested proposals, gives
citizens a third opportunity to ensure their views are heard. There are some important caveats: legislative changes
have raised the bar in terms of the criteria the OSC must consider before referring a decision to the Secretary of
State and the impact of these is yet to be seen. Of course, the extent to which OSCs and council chambers as a
whole are minded to support local opponents of reconfiguration decisions is likely to be shaped to some extent by
party political matters as well as local sentiment and the wider prevailing debate.
Overall, I would see OSCs as one of the few elements of public engagement in the health system which really has
teeth – that is, where citizens have, under certain circumstances, been able to shape important decisions (e.g.
where campaigners halted plans to downgrade Horton General, Banbury, in 2008). This space is created partly
through exploiting local political tensions and partly through the distance that local councillors have from the NHS
itself. Perhaps the more the perspectives of councillors and NHS senior personnel converge, the greater the
likelihood that this space for effective lobbying by organised citizens will shrink.
It remains to be seen whether the other key local authority committee, the Health and Wellbeing Board, is able to
offer the same potential. It may be that precisely as greater responsibility for health transfers to local authorities, the
more local councils will be tempted to ignore, defuse or re-route rather than champion local opposition to health
service decisions. Health and Wellbeing boards include in their membership senior personnel from NHS
commissioning organisations and social care services, so the critical scrutiny perspective of OSCs will not be
replicated exactly. On the other hand, councillors may on occasion see political capital in responding to local
concerns.
Strengthening local democracy in health?
Local democracy in health could be strengthened through reducing the scope of the ‘exempted information’ which
public and private organisations are not required to give to the OSC (Schedule 17 of the 2006 NHS Act). This
includes information which could be described as ‘commercially sensitive’ such as the value and terms of contracts
to provide services. This constitutes precisely the sort of information in which local citizens could legitimately expect
to have an interest given that public services and public funds are at stake.
Democracy could also be strengthened through enabling local Healthwatch to plan for an adequate programme of
work by good funding levels and through extending its powers to enable it to compel personnel from any local health
and social care organisation (public, third sector and private) to attend meetings and answer questions. Perhaps
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above all Healthwatch needs to develop a robust culture in which it is prepared to criticise and challenge NHS
bodies, providers and the Health and Wellbeing Board vociferously if needed. It is difficult to see how this last can be
achieved whilst Healthwatch continues to be contracted by the local authority since a Healthwatch which challenges
the functioning of the local health service could find itself branded as troublemaking and its contract unrenewed.
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